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What are the incentive effects of private pension plans? What is the cost in 
pension benefits of job turnover? How important is vesting? Is there a 
cost in pension benefits of forgoing the early retirement option? Do pen- 
sion stipulations encourage early retirement?  By  analyzing the stipula- 
tions of pension plans, we are able to develop considerable evidence di- 
rected  to these questions.  At the same time, the structural features of 
private pension plans permit new and potentially strong inferences con- 
cerning the contractual nature of labor market agreements and the role of 
pensions in assisting such arrangements. 
Understanding  the  contractual  arrangements  between  workers  and 
firms is important for a host of  economic issues ranging from the degree 
of wage flexibility over the business cycle to the availability of human cap- 
ital insurance within the firm. Discriminating between “spot” and “long- 
term contract” views of the labor market is also critical for evaluating nu- 
merous  questions  specific to private  pensions.  One  such  question  is 
whether workers and employers fully appreciate how complex pension 
plan provisions alter a firm’s total compensation package. Evidence that 
labor markets closely accord to the predictions of a spot market would 
suggest rather small information problems. Equally productive workers, 
in this case, receive identical total annual remuneration regardless of their 
current employer or the specifics of the employer’s pension plan. 
A second question involves proper disclosure and valuation of a pen- 
sion plan’s net financial liabilities. In a spot market setting an employer’s 
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net liability corresponds simply to the accrued value of vested pension 
benefits. Additional pension liabilities projected to arise from future em- 
ployment, in such a setting, are matched dollar for dollar by future pro- 
jected revenues associated with the worker’s continued employment. The 
excess of projected over accrued liabilities should not, therefore, affect a 
firm’s valuation and suggests no case for estimating and disclosing pro- 
jected pension liabilities. Under a long-term contract arrangement, on the 
other hand, revenue from continued employment need not match the ac- 
crual of future pension liabilities, plus the payment of  tenure wages, and 
the disclosure of projected  rather than accrued liabilities is potentially 
more relevant for firm financial valuation. 
A third question is the effect of pensions on labor mobility and hiring 
practices. In a spot market environment the particular and quite peculiar 
rates of pension benefit accrual with age described here would have no 
consequences for labor mobility, since offsetting increases or reductions 
in direct wage compensation would leave the worker indifferent between 
staying on the current job or switching to  another  job offering an identical 
amount of total compensation. A spot market would also entail flexibility 
in wage compensation sufficient to permit hiring equally productive old 
and young, black and white, male and female workers, despite differences 
in their accrual of vested pension benefits reflecting age, race, and sex- 
specific mortality  probabilities.  Long-term  contractual  agreements, in 
contrast, may leave less flexibility to accommodate differences in individ- 
ual circumstances. 
Given knowledge of a worker’s current and previous level of earnings, 
and the benefit and retirement provisions of his pension plan, one could, 
in principle, directly test the spot market hypothesis by checking whether, 
in each year, the sum of the increment to a worker’s accrued vested pen- 
sion benefits plus his wage compensation equaled his marginal product. ’ 
Unfortunately, a worker’s marginal product is unobservable and difficult 
to estimate. In addition new government data linking pension plan provi- 
sions and the earnings histories of participating workers have not yet been 
released.* These data limitations restrict, but by no means preclude, infer- 
ences about spot versus contractual labor market arrangements. 
While little is known about the typical profile of marginal productivity 
by age, it seems safe to assume that this schedule does not exhibit sharp 
discontinuities. In addition, while there is currently no publicly available 
means of  matching particular earnings histories with particular pension 
plans, there is considerable information available concerning the typical 
shape of age-earnings profiles. 
This paper calculates the pattern of accrual of  vested pension benefits 
for alternative, but realistic, age-earnings profiles. These accrual profiles 
are computed for a large sample of plans contained in the Bureau of La- 
bor Statistic’s 1979 Level of Benefits Survey (BLS-LOB). These new pen- 
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sion  participants,  provide  extremely  detailed  information  concerning 
pension benefits, vesting, and early retirement formulas, all of which are 
key inputs to the calculation of pension accruals. 
The sum of the assumed age-earnings profile, measured in constant dol- 
lars, and the associated real pension accrual profile equals, under the spot 
market assumption, the age-marginal productivity profile. Hypothetical 
age-marginal productivity profiles derived in this manner exhibit rather 
sharp discontinuities at two critical ages, the age of full vesting, for plans 
with cliff vesting, and the early retirement age, for plans permitting early 
retirement on better than actuarially fair terms. For a large fraction of 
pension plans making reasonable assumptions concerning age-earnings 
profiles and interest rates, we find discontinuities as large as 50% of wage 
compensation depending on the worker’s age at hire. An alternative state- 
ment of these findings is that for smoothly shaped age-marginal product 
schedules, wage compensation must potentially fall or rise by  roughly 
40% of the wage at the age of cliff vesting and other critical ages to satisfy 
conditions of spot market equilibrium. These figures appear sufficiently 
large to rule out the hypothesis of spot clearing for a large segment of the 
United States labor market. 
In addition to the potentially large discontinuities in pension benefit ac- 
cruals, the pattern of accruals also sheds considerable light on the role of 
pensions in discouraging worker turnover. In many instances even work- 
ers who change jobs with no loss in wage compensation and commence 
employment in a new  firm with an identical pension plan lose a large 
amount in pension benefits. 
The accrual patterns also permit inferences about incentives that pen- 
sions provide for early retirement. Under our actuarial assumptions we 
find positive pension accruals on average throughout the work span, that 
is, worker separation at any time prior to normal retirement typically in- 
volves a loss of remuneration in excess of the loss in wage compensation. 
These findings appear to differ from those of Lazear (1983),  who finds 
that after the age of early retirement, continued work typically involves a 
loss in pension benefits. Part of the difference in results is due to differ- 
ences in interest rate and nominal wage growth assumptions. In addition, 
we  do not consider in this paper benefits for all plans covered by the LOB 
survey. In particular, all plans used in this analysis base benefits on wages. 
As Lazear’s (1983) insightful study points  out, the present expected 
value of  accrued pension benefits represents a form of severance pay for 
workers who choose to separate from the firm. Such severance pay would 
naturally arise in contractual settings in which workers are paid (in wages) 
less than their marginal products. The severance pay may be thought of as 
the return of the worker’s bond, which he puts up to guarantee the quality 
and quantity of his work effort. As the worker ages, the value of this “sev- 
erance pay” rises, according to our findings. In a contractual setting the 
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prior to normal retirement is that real wages represent a lower bound for 
the average marginal product of workers covered by our sample of plans. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that we find large deviations from 
the average, with large negative accruals after the age of  early retirement 
under the provisions of many plans. 
Finally, an additional implication of our findings is that compensating 
differential studies of the trade-off between wages and pension benefits, if 
they are to be meaningful, cannot be based on cross-section evidence at a 
point in time. To understand  the relationship between compensation in 
the form of wages versus pension benefits, one must consider the receipt 
of both over a long period of employment. 
The next section describes procedures used to calculate pension benefit 
accrual and presents illustrative accrual rates for a standard earnings- 
based defined benefit plan, but one that is not integrated with social secu- 
rity. This plan is also used to demonstrate the sensitivity of accrual rates to 
assumptions about wage inflation and interest rates. Section 3.2 presents 
evidence concerning age-earnings profiles, suggesting, in particular, that 
for fully employed workers between ages 55 and 65 who remain in a given 
firm, nominal earnings grow on average at rates commensurate with, if 
not  greater than, inflation.  The assumption of  positive nominal  wage 
growth after age 55 is crucial for generating positive pension benefit ac- 
crual between 55 and 65. Section 3.3 describes the BLS-LOB data set in 
more detail and examines the heterogeneity of accrual profiles for our 
sample of 1183 plans.4 We  conclude the section by  drawing inferences 
from these data concerning the weight of evidence in favor of contractual 
as opposed to spot labor markets. Section 3.4 summarizes principal find- 
ings and suggests areas for future research. 
3.1  Pension Benefit Accrual Formulas and Illustrative Graphs of 
Accrual Profiles 
3.1.1  Accrual Formulas 
To begin, consider the benefit accrual profiles shown in figure 3.1. The 
nominal wage growth incorporated in the top profile assumes moderate 
life-cycle growth in real wages plus a 6% rate of inflation. A 3% real inter- 
est rate (or 9% nominal rate) is also assumed. The lower graphs are based 
on 6% and 9% real (12% and 15% nominal) interest rates, respectively. In 
the paragraphs below we  describe features of pension benefit formulas 
that produce the unusual shapes of these profiles. 
Vested  pension benefit accrual at age a, I@), equals the difference be- 
tween pension wealth at age a + 1, Pw(a + l), and pension wealth at age 
a, Pw(a),  accumulated to age a + 1 at the nominal interest rate r: 
(1)  I(a) = Pw(a + 1) -  Pw(a)(l  + r). 59  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
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Fig. 3.1  Pension increments as a percentage of  salary, by age, for a 
wage stream with 6%  inflation discounted at real interest rates 
of  3%, 6%, and 9%. 
Pension wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension 
benefits discounted to age a. Intuitively, Pw(a)  can be thought of as the 
worker’s pension bank account. If I(a)  equals zero, the worker continuing 
employment with the plan sponsor at age a has exactly the same pension 
wealth at age (I + 1 as an identically situated worker who terminates em- 
ployment at age u. Pension accrual is thus the increment to pension wealth 
in excess of the return on the previously accumulated pension bank ac- 
count. 
If  the  labor market  exhibits spot market equilibrium,  I(a) plus the 
worker’s nonpension compensation at age a, W(a),  equals the worker’s 
marginal product at age a, M(a): 
(2)  M(a) = W(a)  + I@). 
Obviously, if  W(a)  is a smooth function of age and I@)  exhibits sharp dis- 
continuities, M(a)  must exhibit sharp discontinuities at these same ages to 
satisfy (2). 
The source of discontinuities in age accrual profiles is clarified by con- 
sidering a sample earnings-related defined benefit plan with  “cliff vest- 
ing” at 10 years of service. Vested accrued benefits are clearly zero prior to 
the age at which the worker has 10 years of credited service in the plan. Let 
R(a, t)  denote the ratio of I(a)  to W(a)  for a worker age a with t years of 
tenure. Then R(a, t)  is zero for t < 9. If a person age a with nine years of 
service works an additional year, the ratio of the increment to the wage 
W(a)  is 60  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise 
In (3), B(a, t)  is the retirement benefit available to the worker who termi- 
nates employment with the plan sponsor at age a after t years of  service 
but who delays receipt of  pension benefits until the plan's normal retire- 
ment age. The normal and early retirement ages assumed for this stylized 
plan are 65 and 55, respectively. Terminating workers are, however, eligi- 
ble for early retirement benefits. Our hypothetical plan reduces benefits 
by d percent for each year that early retirement precedes normal retire- 
ment. The benefit reduction rate, d, could be greater than, equal to, or 
less than the actuarial fair rate. Today most plans offering early retire- 
ment appear to stipulate smaller than actuarially fair reduction rates; con- 
sequently, the formulas presented here assume that workers always gain 
by receiving their vested accrued benefits at the earliest possible date. 
The function A(55) is  the actuarial discount  factor that transforms 
benefit flows initiating at age 55 into expected stocks of pension wealth at 
age 55. Expectations here are taken with respect to longevity. Thus A(55) 
is the annuity value of a dollar's worth of pension benefits to be received 
each year until death, beginning at age 55. For simplicity assume that the 
probability of dying prior to age 55 is zero. Hence the present value at age 
aofA(55)isA(a)  = A(55)(1 + r)-(ss  - O)fora 5  55. Ifpensionbenefitsare 
determined as a constant X times the product of final year's earnings and 
service, and there is no offset for receipt of social security benefits, B(a, t) 
is simply 
(4)  B(a, t)  = XW(a)t, 
and 
W(a + 1)  (5)  R  (a, 9) = X(l  + 4-I' (1 + r)-Ls5  - ('+  l)lA(55)10 * 
W(4  a 
R(a, t),  for t increasing pari passu with age, is zero prior to t equals 9 
and jumps at t equals 9 to the value given in (5). Cliff vesting thus pro- 
duces spikes in the accrual profile such as that in figure 3.1 at 10  years of 
service. Between the age at cliff vesting and age 55, pension wealth Pw(a) 
is given by 
(6)  Pw(a) = XW(a)(l + d)-IO(l + r)-(55-4A(55)t, 
and the hcrement to pension wealth I(a)  divided by the wage W(a)  is given 
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Equations (7) and (5)  suggest a drop in R(a, t)  as a increases to a + 1 con- 
current with an increase in t from 9 to 10. Equation (7) will be positive if 
the term in brackets exceeds zero. This will be the case if the percent in- 
crease in the wage plus the percent increase in years employed (Vt) is great- 
er than zero. Assuming the term in brackets is positive and is roughly con- 
stant, R(a, t)  will increase exponentially due to the exponential decline in 
the discount factor, (1 + r)-lSs  -  (a +  I)],  as a approaches 55. 
If the value of d is considerably less than actuarially fair, a discontinuity 
in R(a, t)  occurs at the early retirement age, 55. At ages 55 and 56 we have 
(8)  Pw(55) = XW(55)(1 + 4-IoA(55)t 
and 
(9)  Pw(56) = XW(56)(1  + ~f-~A(56)(t  + 1). 
Hence, 
W(56)  t + 1  A(56)  (1 + d) -  -~ 
W(55)  t  A(55)  (1 + r) 
X(l + d)-IO(l + r)A(55)t 
Assuming wage growth at 54 is close to that at 55 and A(56)  approxi- 
mately equals A(55),  then R(55, t)  primarily differs from R(54,  t - 1) be- 
cause the first term in the bracket in (7) is now multiplied by (1 + d), while 
the second term, -  1, is multiplied by (1  + r). Since r exceeds d by as- 
sumption, R(55, t)  can easily be less than R(54, t -  1). Indeed, this change 
in the functional form of R(a, t)  can produce sharp drops in accrual rates 
at the early retirement age for a host of pension plans and a range of real- 
istic economic assumptions. Figure 3.1 illustrates such discontinuities. 
It is.  important to realize that the early retirement  reduction,  lower 
wages, and one less year of tenure yield lower benefits at 55 than at 56. 
The early retirement reduction reduces benefits at the rate d.  But if bene- 
fits were taken at  55 they could accrue interest at the rate r.  Thus by forgo- 
ing the early retirement option of receiving benefits at 55, a cost is in- 
curred that depends on the difference r -  d. If this loss is not offset by the 
increase due to wage growth and one year of additional tenure, there will 
be a drop in the benefit accrual rate between 55 and 56. 
The same considerations pertain to benefit increments between 56 and 
65. Recall that we have assumed a less than fair early retirement reduction 
so that benefits accrued before 55 are valued assuming receipt of benefits 
at the age that yields maximum pension wealth. The optimum time to re- 
ceive benefits accrued between 55 and 56 is 56, between 56 and 57 is 57, 
and so forth. But to gain benefits from working another year, it is neces- 62  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David  A. Wise 
sary to forgo the option of immediately taking accrued benefits at an ad- 
vantageous reduction rate. 
(11)  R(a, t)  = X(1  + d)-(65-0)(1  + r)A(a)t 
Between ages 56 and 65,  R(a, t)  equals 
I1  *  [  W(a)  t  A@)  (1 + r) 
W(a + 1)  (t  + 1)  A(a + 1)  (1 + d) - 
In contrast to the R(a, t)  formula in (7) applying to the period between 
cliff vesting and early retirement, (1 1) indicates that the actuarial reduc- 
tion factor-rather  than the interest rate r-imparts  an upward tilt in the 
R(a, t)  profile between early and normal retirement, as long as the term in 
brackets is positive. In (1 1) as in (7) and (10) the accrual rate, R(a, t)  is an 
increasing function of the rate of nominal wage growth. Larger nominal 
interest rates reduce accrual rates at all ages, with a negative interaction 
with age prior to early retirement. 
Finally, while equation (7) is unlikely to be negative, wide differences 
between wage growth and the interest rate r can yield negative increments 
in pension wealth after the early retirement age. To a first approximation, 
the bracketed term in equation (1  1) will be positive if A W/  W + l/t > r -  d 
where A W/  W is the percent increase in wages and l/t the percent increase 
in tenure. It is easy to see, however, that low wage growth and high inter- 
est rates will yield negative increments. Thus actuarial increments after 
the early retirement  age are very sensitive to assumed  values for wage 
growth and the interest rate. 
While the preceding formulas suggest the general shape of accrual rate 
profiles, there are few earnings-based plans with features as simple as the 
one considered here. In addition to more complicated rules for plan par- 
ticipation and vesting that often involve age as well as service require- 
ments, there are a variety of methods of computing earnings bases, in- 
cluding  career  averages,  and  averages  of  earnings,  possibly  highest 
earnings, over a specified period or number of  years. Reduction rates for 
early retirement are often a specified function of age, if not length of  ser- 
vice. Some plans allow no further accrual after a given number of years of 
service. Roughly 30% of defined benefit participants belong to plans that 
are integrated with social security. There are two, not necessarily indepen- 
dent, important forms of “integration.” One involves a “step rate” bene- 
fit formula that uses a different value for the percentage of the product of 
earnings times service for levels of earnings below and levels above speci- 
fied values. The second is referred to as an “offset” formula that reduces 
pension benefits by some fraction of the participant’s basic social security 
benefit. Many of the offset plans set ceilings on the extent of the offset. A 
minority of plans, in particular those with social security offset formulas, 
provide supplemental benefits for early retirees prior to their receipt of 63  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
social security benefits.  The supplemental benefit  formulas can also be 
fairly involved, incorporating both the participant’s age and service in the 
calculation. There are also plans that use one benefit formula to compute 
early retirement benefits and a different formula to determine normal re- 
tirement benefits. In addition to these earnings-related plans, a significant 
number of plans covering over 40% of defined benefit participants calcu- 
late benefits independent of the participant’s  earnings history (Kotlikoff 
and Smith 1983, table 4.5.1).  These formulas can also be quite complex. 
There are other plans that are earnings related but provide differing flat 
benefit  amounts based  on the participant’s  earnings  bracket.  Finally, 
there are plans that specify minimum and maximum benefit levels. 
Each of these additional features can significantly alter the profile of 
accrual rates by age, especially the extent of discontinuities in the profile. 
Our analysis in Section 3.4 of pension plans in the BLS-LOB sample takes 
account of a great number of  these complexities. Two important excep- 
tions in the current paper are plans with non-earnings-related benefit for- 
mulas and plans with supplemental benefit formulas. These plans will be 
considered in future research. 
The assumption of constant nominal interest rates implies a quite dif- 
ferent pattern of pension accrual than would occur with variable interest 
rates. Changes in long-term nominal interest rates produce capital gains 
and losses on previously accumulated pension wealth that do not directly 
affect pension accrual. However, as indicated in equations (9,  (7), (lo), 
and (1 l), accrual rates are also a direct function of the currently prevailing 
long-term interest  rates. A time path of varying interest rates around a 
constant mean would produce a much more discontinuous  age-pension 
accrual profile than those of figure 3.1 and other diagrams in this paper. 
3.1.2  Illustrative Graphs of Accrual Profiles 
Figure 3.2 depicts three accrual rate profiles for a worker who begins 
participating at age 30 in a defined benefit plan similar to that described 
above. The plan calculates normal retirement  benefits as 1%  of average 
earnings over the last five years of service times years of  service. Benefits 
are reduced by 3% for each year that early retirement precedes normal re- 
tirement. Cliff vesting occurs after 10 years. The early and normal retire- 
ment ages are 55 and 65, respectively. 
Nominal wage growth is determined by two factors, a cross-sectional 
profile of “merit” increases by age and an assumed economy-wide rate of 
wage inflation. The merit profile involves approximately a 50% growth in 
real wages between ages 30 and 50 and very little growth from 50 to 65. 
The rate of wage inflation incorporates both across-the-board increases in 
labor productivity and the price level. The three profiles in figure 3.2 dif- 
fer both in their assumed rate of wage inflation and nominal interest rates. 
The 2% wage inflation profile discounts pension benefits at a 5% nominal 64  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise 
Fig. 3.2  Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by age, for wage 
inflation of 2070,  6%, and  10%. Note: Benefits are discounted 
at a 3qo real interest rate. 
rate,  while the 6%  and  10% wage inflation profiles use 9% and  13% 
nominal interest rates, respectively. 
These assumptions about wage growth and nominal interest rates pro- 
duce “vesting spikes” ranging form 5% to 37% of wages at age 40. The in- 
termediate wage and interest rate assumption produces a 14% spike at 
cliff vesting. All three profiles indicate reductions in the accrual rate of 
about 8 percentage points at age 56. In order to reconcile these profiles 
with the dictates of spot market equilibrium, one must believe that mar- 
ginal products rise abruptly by an additional 5% to 37% exactly at age 40 
and then fall by an additional 3% to 3  1070 exactly at age 41. In addition, an 
abrupt decline in the worker’s marginal product of close to 8 percentage 
points exactly at age 56 that occurs neither before nor after 56 is required 
for the theory of spot equilibrium. 
One response to these profiles is  that  straight wage  compensation, 
rather than increasing smoothly through time, could adjust to meet the 
spot mark?.  Figure 3.3 suggests the implausibility of this view. Here ac- 
crual rate profiles for workers joining the pension plan at ages 30,40, and 
50 are presented based on the intermediate wage and interest rate assump- 
tions of figure 3.2. The vesting spikes for the three profiles are 14%, 36‘4’0, 
and 66% of the corresponding wage at ages 40, 50, and 60. While vesting 
at these latter ages is much less common than prior to age 40, Kotlikoff 
and Smith (1983, table 3.6.5) report that over a quarter of current defined 
benefit pension recipients retired with 20 or fewer years of service. 65  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
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Figure 3.3 is constructed under the assumption that the workers of the 
same age receive identical wage compensation.  Thus the diagram indi- 
cates the potential loss in accrued pension benefits for workers who switch 
jobs but receive the same wage compensation in the new job and are cov- 
ered by the same pension plan. We present below a similar diagram, based 
on a plan like our base plan but without the early retirement option. In 
this case, the loss is substantially greater. 
Figure 3.4  highlights the importance of the early retirement benefit re- 
duction  formula for pension accrual.  The profile labeled “early retire- 
ment option” repeats the accrual profile from figures 3.2 and 3.3 based on 
intermediate economic assumptions. The “retirement at 65 only” profile 
indicates the pattern of accrual rates for the same plan but excludes the 
early retirement option. This profile could also be labeled “actuarially 
fair accrual rates” since, by definition, an actuarially fair early retirement 
reduction formula produces an accrual profile that is independent of the 
age at which benefits are first received. 
To the extent that retirement benefits provide an incentive to continue 
working, the incentive is much greater without the early retirement option 
than with it. It is important to realize that the difference is only a matter of 
the pattern of  accruals; for workers who retire at normal retirement, the 
total accumulation of accrued benefits is independent of whether the plan 
does or does not have an early retirement option. 
In contrast to the “early retirement option,” the actuarially fair “re- 
tirement at 65 only” profile exhibits a 6% rather than a 14% value for R 66  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise 
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Fig. 3.4  Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by age, for plans 
with an early retirement option versus retirement at 65. 6% 
wage inflation, 3% real interest rate. 
(a, 10) at cliff vesting. In addition there is no discontinuity at age 55 in the 
latter profile. While these features of the actuarially fair profile are less 
troubling  for the spot market hypothesis, the very rapid rate of benefit 
accrual between 55 and 65 presents other difficulties for this view of the 
labor market. The merit schedule built into the nominal wage profile im- 
plies a quite limited growth in real wages of workers after age 55. If any- 
thing, this schedule appears to  provide for too much growth in real wages 
after 50. As described in the next section, cross-sectional profiles of earn- 
ings by age decline slightly after age 50 for virtually all classification of 
workers  by occupation and major industry.  Since a 3% growth in real 
wages due to economywide productivity growth is above historic aver- 
ages, one might reasonably infer that real wage growth after age 55 is be- 
low  3%. The actuarially  fair profile of  figure 3.4, however, entails in- 
creases in total real pension remuneration of almost 20% of  real wages 
between ages 55 and 65. Needless to say, it is difficult to accept the spot 
market implication that, in addition to productivity-induced  real wage 
growth, workers at age 65 are 20% more productive than they are at age 
55. Thus the plan examined in figure 3.4 indicates that the difficulty in 
reconciling pension accrual rates with a spot market is not simply the re- 
sult of early retirement benefit provisions. 
Figure 3.5 and figure 3.1 above demonstrate the sensitivity of the ac- 
crual profiles to assumptions about nominal wage growth and nominal 
interest rates. Figure 3.5 repeats figure 3.4 under the assumption of a 10% 
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Fig. 3.5  Pension increments as a percentage of  salary, by age, for plans 
with an early retirement option versus retirement at 65. 0% 
wage inflation, 10% real interest rate. 
retirement option accrual rates after age 55 are substantially  negative, 
approaching -  15% of salary at age 65. With no early retirement option, 
on the other hand, accrual rates are always positive. The bottom profile in 
figure 3.1 incorporates 6% nominal wage growth but a 15% nominal in- 
terest rate. The intermediate profile in figure 3.1 is based on 6%  wage 
growth and a 12% nominal interest rate. It yields increments at 65 that are 
approximately  zero.  These figures indicate that a considerable gap be- 
tween nominal interest rates and wage growth rates is needed to produce 
negative accrual rates. 
Finally, we illustrate in figure 3.6  the cost of job change with no early re- 
tirement option. It should be compared with figure 3.3. The plans repre- 
sented in the two diagrams are the same except that in figure 3.6  the early 
retirement reduction schedule is assumed to be actuarially fair (or, that 
there is no early retirement  option). Again,  the top line of  this graph 
shows the accrual rate under our plan for a person who starts work at age 
30 (with 6% wage inflation and a 3% real interest rate). A person with one 
job change would accumulate benefits up to age 41 according to the top 
curve but then would accumulate benefits according to the curve labeled 
“age 41.” Note that no benefits would be accumulated for the first  10 
years. The difference in accumulated pension benefits at age 65 reflects 
both the difference in the areas under the two accrual paths and the inter- 
est rate used in accumulation of these flows. This difference could be very 
substantial and depends, of course, both on when job changes occur and 
how frequently they occur. It is important to note that the loss in accrued 68  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David  A. Wise 
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Fig. 3.6  Pension increments as a percentage of  salary, by age, for an 
employee beginning at 3 1, 41,  5 1, with no early retirement 
option. Note: 6% wage inflation, 3% real interest rate. 
benefits from job change in this example is not due solely to vesting; in 
figure 3.6, accrual in  years after vesting  occurs is larger  for a worker 
remaining on the same job for 35 years than for a worker who changes 
jobs (literally pension plans). This lower accrual beyond vesting for later 
plan entrants results from the interaction of tenure and wage growth in 
earnings-based defined benefit pension formulas. To see the nature of this 
interaction, consider a plan with immediate vesting that pays 2% of final 
year’s salary times years of service. For a worker experiencing positive 
wage growth who is employed for 30 years and retires at 60 the pension 
benefit is 2% of the age 60 salary times 30. If this same worker with the 
same wage growth were to change jobs each year, joining  an identical 
plan, his benefit would equal 2% times the sum of the 30 annual salaries. 
Assuming positive wage growth, the pension benefit of  the former worker, 
which is based on the age 60 salary, will exceed that of the latter worker 
whose benefit is primarily based on the lower earnings received in earlier 
years of his career. 
3.2  Wage Rate Profiles 
To calculate average pension benefit increments by industry-occupation 
group, for a given length of employment, we need estimates of age-wage 
profiles  for each  group.  It  is  particularly  important that assumptions 
about the wage profiles of older workers be as realistic as possible. With- 69  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
out lengthy longitudinal records on individuals, we  have no completely 
satisfactory way of estimating age-wage profiles. The Retirement History 
Survey (RHS), however, does provide some longitudinal data for older 
workers.’ We first discuss evidence from these data and then present esti- 
mated age-wage profiles based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data. For older workers the two sources of data seem to provide roughly 
consistent evidence. 
The age-wage profiles appropriate for determining pension accrual are 
clearly those pertaining to workers staying in the same firm. Thus tenure 
as well as age should be included in the analysis of earnings by age. Our 
accrual profiles also assume full-time employment. Hence, wage rates per 
unit of time is the appropriate earnings concept for our purposes. While 
conventionally computed age-earnings profiles sometimes show a down- 
ward trend for older workers, this appears due, in part, to a reduction in 
hours worked and in part to  the mix of full-time and part-time workers in 
the sample. 
3.2.1 
The RHS data are based on a sample of persons who were first surveyed 
in 1969 when they were between 58 and 63. These respondents were resur- 
veyed every two years until  1979. Table 3.1 shows the means of hourly 
wages by age and year for persons who reported an hourly wage rate and 
who were not partially or fully retired in a given year. For a given calendar 
year, these data in general show little decline in wage rates at least through 
age 63 or 64. The number of observations per cell is fairly small since the 
cells only include older individuals who are still working. Possibly those 
whose wage rates would have fallen from one year to the next are less likely 
to be in the sample. Analogous calculations showing the median of annual 
salaries of persons who reported weekly, monthly, or annual salaries are 
presented in table 3.2. Here again, in the cross-section, there are relatively 
constant real salary levels through age 64 among persons who are not re- 
tired, although there seems to be some decline on average. 
The  accrual  calculations  require,  however,  nominal  wage  profiles. 
From both tables 3.1 and 3.2, it is clear that nominal wages of older work- 
ers increased rather rapidly over this period. A more precise indication of 
nominal increases is shown in table 3.3 for all persons who reported weekly, 
monthly, or annual salaries. The entry corresponding to age 58-60 and the 
year 1969-7 1 is the median salary increase between 1969 and 197 1 over all 
persons who were 58 in 1969 and who reported salary figures in both 1969 
and 1971. The other entries are calculated in an analogous manner.  The 
table shows very substantial nominal increases over this period, on  the or- 
der of 6% per year on  average. (The entries pertain to a two-year interval.) 
Considering the average increments by age in the last column, there is 
Evidence from the Retirement History Survey 70  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David  A. Wise 






































(24)  (18) 
2.83  3.48 
(13)  (22) 
3.85  4.34  4.42 
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3.60  2.71  3.82 
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3.25  4.45 
(10)  (7) 
4.25  4.16 





3.59  4.62 
Source: Retirement History Survey. Excludes people who say they are partially or fully re- 
tired. The number of observations used to calculate the associated value is recorded in paren- 
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Table 3.2  Medians of Annual Salary for Non-Self-Employed Males, by Age and 
Year 
- 












































































Source: Retirement History Survey. Excludes people who say they are partially or fully re- 
tired. The number of observations used to calculate  the associated value is recorded in paren- 
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Table 3.3  Median Percentage Changes in Annual Salary for Non-Self-Employed 










































Source: Retirement History Survey. Excludes people who say they are partially or fully re- 
tired. The number of observations used to calculate the associated value is recorded in paren- 
theses. 
some evidence that the increases declined somewhat with age. At least 
through  1977-after  which our sample sizes are very small-it  appears 
that salary increases for these older workers were in general keeping up 
with price increases. The percent increases in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for the years 1969-77 were as shown in the unnumbered table on 
page 73. 73  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 



















In short, these data suggest substantial nominal wage increases for older 
workers, roughly consistent, on average, with overall inflation levels. 
3.2.2  Wage-Tenure Profiles from the Current Population Survey 
To estimate age-tenure profiles by industry and occupation group, we 
matched the May  1979 Supplement to the March  1979 CPS. The May 
Supplement provides tenure data, while the wage data come from the 
March tape. We  were able to obtain the required wage, age, and tenure 
information  for  somewhat  over  15,000 persons  in  the  24  industry- 
occupation groups distinguished in the LOB survey. Relevant cell sample 
sizes, however, were large enough to obtain “reasonable” estimates for 
only 16 groups, noted below. 
After considerable experimentation with two-way tables showing aver- 
age salary by age and tenure, we elected simply to obtain least-squares es- 
timates of wage rates using the specification 
(12)  W = a,,  + al  A  + a2A2  + b,T  + b2T2  + CAT, 
where Wis the wage rate, A is age, and Tis tenure. To estimate wage levels 
by age for a person who entered a firm at, for example, age 30 we calculated 
(13)  W = 20 + 2,A + 22A2 + 6I(A -  30) + &(A - 30)’ 
+ E(A)(A -  30), 
for values of A between 30 and 65. 
The estimated profiles for the total group, and by occupation over all 
industry groups, are presented in figure 3.7. These profiles are empirical 
counterparts of the “merit” scale used in the illustrative calculations in 
Section 3.1 above. 
The cross-sectional age-earnings profile (1 3) for all groups combined 
increases by about 50% between age 30 and 52 when it reaches its maxi- 
mum. Then it declines by about 10% over the next 13 years, or about .8% 
per year on average. Assuming a wage inflation rate of  6%, therefore, 
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per year. For older workers this path of nominal wage growth seems to be 
in rough accord with the evidence from the Retirement History Survey. 
In addition to the graphs of the cross-section wage profiles,  summary 
indicators of their shapes are provided in table 3.4. It shows salary at age 
30, maximum salary, the age of maximum salary, and salary at age 65, to- 
gether  with  average  percent  increases between  the end points  and the 
maximum. 
3.3  Accrual Rates from the BLS Level of Benefits Survey 
The BLS-LOB  (1979) establishments constitute  a subsample  of  the 
1979 National  Survey of  Professional,  Administrative,  Technical,  and 
Clerical Pay. Based on the file’s population weights, this subsample covers 
17,965,282 private pension plan participants in the United States, which is 
slightly over half of all participants covered by private pensions. The sub- 
sample’s universe consisted of all firms with over 100 employees with the 
exception of mining, construction, and retail trade establishments where 
the minimum  firm  size was  250 employees and service establishments 
where the minimum firm size was 50 employees. Sampled establishments 
were requested to report work schedules and information about 11 differ- 
ent types of fringe benefits. This information was provided for each of the 
three occupational  groups. The BLS-LOB  (1979) pension benefits tape 
consists of establishment records for each occupational group that detail 
features  of  pension  benefit  plans  covering  the particular  occupational 75  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
Table 3.4  Summary Statistics on Wage Profiles by Industry and Occupation 
Group 
Average  Average 
Percent  Increase  Percent Decrease 
Industry and  Salary at  Max Salary  Salary at Age 30 to  Maximum to 
Occupation  Age 30  (Age)  Age 65  Maximum  Age 65 
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Source: May 1979 Current Population Survey. 76  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise 
group in  question.  Unfortunately firm identifiers  are intentionally  ex- 
cluded from the computer record; hence, it is impossible to reconstruct 
the actual pension characteristics of the initial establishment. The data 
can, however, be used to estimate industry-wide or occupation-wide val- 
ues of pension variables. 
In this section we examine accrual ratios for 1183 earnings-based de- 
fined benefit plans. Earnings-based plans account for approximately 80% 
of BLS-designated usable plans from the survey and about 65% of plans 
weighted  by pension  coverage.6 Each of  the 1183  plans  stipulates cliff 
vesting at 10 years, but the plans have different normal and early retire- 
ment ages. Other earnings-based plans with different vesting ages have ac- 
crual profiles similar to those that we shall describe, but for convenience 
of exposition we have not included them in our analysis here. Of the 1183 
plans, 508 are integrated with social security under an offset formula. 
Table 3.5 presents weighted average accrual ratios for the 1183 plans by 
early and normal retirement ages for workers hired at age 3 1. Our inter- 
mediate assumptions of 6% nominal wage growth and a 9% interest rate 
are used in conjunction with the industry-occupation-age-earnings  pro- 
files discussed in Section 3.2. The spike at the age of vesting varies with 
early retirement and normal retirement ages. It is 24% for plans with early 
and normal retirement at 55. Among the plans with early retirement at 55 
the vesting spike declines with the age of normal retirement, with a vesting 
spike of approximately 12% for plans with normal retirement at 60 and a 
spike of about 7% for plans with normal retirement at 65. For plans with 
later early and normal retirement ages, the vesting spike is much smaller, 
ranging from a little over 3% to about 5%. 
A total of 356 plans have the same early and normal retirement ages, 
that is, they do not permit early retirement. For example, there are 209 
plans with both early and normal retirement at age 55. In this case, the ac- 
crual ratio is about 5% immediately after vesting and increases to about 
15% by age 50. Between ages 50 and 55 the accrual ratio increases to al- 
most 27%. A similar pattern is observed for the other plans in which the 
normal and early retirement ages are the same, but the accrual ratios just 
after vesting are no more than 1%  in these cases.  It may be noted that 
these plans correspond to our earlier description of plans with no  early re- 
tirement provision, as depicted, for example, in figure 3.4. We have not 
calculated accrual ratios after the age of normal retirement, but it appears 
that accrual after the normal retirement age in most cases is very small and 
in some cases significantly negative.  Hence, there appears to be a very 
substantial  discontinuous  drop in the rate of pension  accrual after the 
normal retirement age for a significant fraction of private pension plans. 
In subsequent work we shall describe in detail the accrual rates of  plans 
after the age of normal retirement. 
Plans with early retirement typically exhibit a rather slow increase in ac- 
crual ratios after vesting until a few years before the age of early retire- 77  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
Table 3.5  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percentage of Earnings Plans 
with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by Early (E) and Normal (N) Retirement 
Age 
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Note:  Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 
ment. There is often a sharp drop in the accrual ratio at that age, with 
either limited increases or  gradual declines in accrual ratios thereafter. For 
example, of the 528 plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retire- 
ment at 65 the accrual ratio reaches about 10% at age 55 and then drops 
by about 30%  to 7%  at age 56. By age 65 the accrual ratio has fallen to 
5Vo. The pattern exhibited by these plans is similar to the one described in 
figure 3.4 for a typical plan with a normal retirement provision. 
A comparison of plans with and without a social security offset is pre- 
sented in table 3.6, for plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retire- 
ment at 55,62,  or 65. There are two major differences in these plans: first, 
the within-group weighted average spike at vesting is very substantial for 78  Laurence J. Kotlikoff/David A. Wise 
Table 3.6  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percentage of Earnings Plans 
with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, and Early Retirement at Age 55, by Normal 
Retirement Age and Social Security Offset 
(N = Number of Plans) 
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Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 
plans without social security offset, ranging from 12% to 26% and is very 
small for plans with a social security offset with the exception of  plans 
with normal retirement at age 55. In this case the average spike at vesting 
is about 8%. Second, the discontinuity in accrual ratios at the age of early 
retirement is much larger for plans without a social security offset than for 
plans with an offset. For example, among plans with normal retirement at 
age 62, there is a 55% drop in the accrual ratio between ages 55 and 56, 
while for plans with a social security offset the drop is about 17%. 79  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
The smaller reduction in the accrual ratio at age 55 for these social secu- 
rity offset plans appears to be explained as follows. Because workers expe- 
rience faster wage growth prior to their mid-fifties, their social security 
Primary  Insurance  Amount,  a  key  determinant  of  the  benefit  offset, 
grows at a faster rate for younger workers. This factor plus the ceilings on 
the offset amount established by many of these plans means that social se- 
curity offsets reduce accrual ratios prior  to a worker’s mid-fifties by a 
greater percentage than after his or her mid-fifties. As a consequence, the 
reduction in the accrual ratio at age 55 is proportionally smaller in offset 
plans than in nonoffset plans. 
To demonstrate the wide variation among plans with the same early and 
normal retirement ages, we have reproduced in table 3.7 the accrual ratios 
for plans with normal retirement at 55 and early retirement at 65, together 
with the minimum and maximum accruals among these plans for each 
age. Almost half of the plans have these early and normal retirement ages. 
Table 3.7  Weighted Average and Minimum and Maximum Accrual Rates for 
Percentage of Earnings Plans, with 10-Year Cliff Vesting with Early 



























Average  Minimum  Maximum 
,069  .OOo  .388 
,013  -  ,025  .072 
.016  -  .025  .081 
.018  -  .027  .092 
,020  -  ,026  .104 
.023  -  ,079  .118 
.026  -  .028  .133 
.03  1  -  .025  .164 
.034  -  .020  ,169 
.040  -  .021  .191 
.046  -  .011  .215 
.052  -  .020  .243 
.062  -  .018  .274 
.072  -  .015  .309 
.083  -  ,014  .348 
.097  -  .005  .409 
.071  -  .065  .43 1 
.074  -  .063  .355 
.079  -  .050  .252 
.081  -  .046  .309 
.083  -  .064  .351 
.074  -  .I57  .347 
.070  -.155  .334 
.063  -  .I94  .320 
.060  -  .221  .471 
.052  -  .326  .350 
Note: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 80  Laurence J.  Kotlikoff/David  A. Wise 
The average accrual ratios, as noted above, rise to about 10% by the age 
of early retirement and then fall to about 5% by the age of  normal retire- 
ment at 65.  But there is a very large variation among the plans. In particu- 
lar, a large number of plans exhibit negative rates of pension accrual after 
the age of early retirement, while others have much higher accrual ratios 
than the average. For example, at 65 the accrual ratios range from a low of 
a negative 33% to a high of  about 35%.  These differences highlight the 
potential importance of joint consideration of  wage rates and pension ac- 
cruals, a task that we shall pursue in the future if appropriate data can be 
obtained. 
Table 3.8 shows how average accrual ratios vary across industries. An 
important difference  among the five industry groups is the proportion 
with specific early and normal retirement  ages. Approximately 60% of 
plans in manufacturing have early retirement at 55 and normal retirement 
at 65,  while in retail trade more than 90% are in this group. Over 60%  of 
plans in manufacturing, on the other hand, have early retirement as well 
as normal retirement at 55. Very few plans in retail trade, finance, or ser- 
vices have normal retirement at 55. 
Plans with early and normal retirement  at 55 have approximately the 
same weighted  average accrual patterns in each of the industry groups, 
with a spike at vesting close to 25%  and the accrual ratio at 55 ranging be- 
tween 20%  and 27%.  The typical plan with normal retirement  at age 62 
exhibits a substantial drop in the accrual ratio at the early retirement age 
of  55. The drop is about 35%  in manufacturing and in finance and over 
50% in transportation. 
Plans with normal retirement at 65 typically exhibit an accrual pattern 
that is much flatter than the pattern exhibited by the other plans in each 
industry. These plans exhibit a drop in the accrual ratio at the age of early 
retirement that ranges from a low of 14% in services to a high of 35%  in 
retail trade. The average accrual rate at 65 is  -6%  in retail trade and 
+ 11  070  in finance. It is approximately 6%  in services and transportation 
and 7% in manufacturing. 
Early and normal retirement  supplements lead to widely varying ac- 
crual patterns, and we  have not tried to summarize them here. We will, 
however, present details of these plans in a subsequent paper. We  shall 
also describe in future work the accrual pattern of flat rate plans with 
benefits based only on years of  service. Approximately 35%  of the BLS- 
LOB pension plans weighted by coverage are of this type. They typically 
exhibit negative accrual ratios after the age of early retirement. 
Job change can reduce pension benefits substantially. For 749 plans we 
calculated accrued benefits at age 65 for persons hired at 3 1,41, and 5 1. In 
these calculations, we assume that a person does not become vested in an- 
other plan prior to joining the firm. For each plan we  calculate accrued 
benefits, using the associated industry-occupation wage profiles, for each 
of  the hiring ages. The comparison of benefits of persons hired at 31 with Table 3.8 
Manufacturing 
:=55,  E=55,  E=55, 
J=55  N=62  N=65 
U=49)  (N=137)  (N=264) 
Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percentage of Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by Industry and by Early (E) and Normal 
(N) Retirement Ages 
(N = Number of  Plans) 
Transportation  Retail Trade  Finance  Services 
E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55, 
N=55  N=62 N=65  N=55 N=62 N=65  N=55  N=62  N=65  N=55  N=62  N=65 

























































.056  .252 
.011  .049 
.013  .056 
.015  .063 
.017  .072 
.020  .082 
.023  .092 
.027  ,105 
.030  .I  18 
.036  .I33 
.042  .151 
.047  .I71 
.053  .193 
.063  .218 
.074  .246 

























.I20  .021 
.021  .020 
.024  .019 
.027  .018 
.030  .017 
.034  .015 
.035  .016 
.040  .016 
.045  .016 
.051  .094 
.059  .112 
,067  .I27 
.080  .I42 
.098  .I65 
.111  .174 





.Wl  .080  .lo2 
.001  .014  .032 
.001  ,016  .039 
.001  .018  .046 
.002  .019  .055 
.002  .021  .065 
.002  .024  .077 
.003  .026  .091 
.003  .029  .I06 
.007  ,032  .121 
.a15  .035  .144 
.020  .039  .I03 
.022  .043  .I48 
.025  .047  .I70 
.081  .050  .199 
.099  .056  .232 
.089  .035 
.086  .034 
.116  .028 
































































































.110 Manufacturing  Transportation  Retail Trade  Finance 
E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55,  E=55, 
N=55  N=62  N=65  N=55  N=62  N=65  N=55  N=62  N=65  N=55  N=62  N=65 
Age  (N=49) (N=137) (N=264) (N=145) (N=46) (N=37) (N=2)  (N=6)  (N=90) (N=S)  (N=25) (N=77) 
Services 
E=55,  E=55,  E=55, 
N=55  N=62  N=65 







.lo3  .087  .147  .114  .099  .019  .I40  .114  .I13  .114 
.083  .079  .119  .098  .072  .014  .076  .lo8  .144  .083 
.178  .077  .075  .079  .lo6  .093  .047  .004  .067  .lo9 
.077  .070  -  .015  .110  .071 
.076  .069  -  .025  .I13  .066 
.074  .066  -  .057  .110  .057 83  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
those hired at 41 and 51 is made in two ways. The first is to sum age 65 ac- 
crued benefits over all plans for each age of hire and calculate the ratio of 
the sum of the benefits if persons were hired at 41 (or 51) to the sum if the 
same persons were hired at 3 1.  The second comparison is the average of 
the ratios calculated for each plan, with each ratio weighted by the num- 
ber of persons covered by the plan. The results are shown in table 3.9. 
Table 3.9  Accrued Benefits at Age 65 for Persons Hired at Aged 41 and 51, as 
Percentage of the Benefits of Persons Hired at Age 31 
Plans Included and Age 
When Hired (N  = Number  Weighted Average 
of  Plans)  of Benefits  of  the Plan Ratios 
Ratio of the Sum 
A11  plans (N = 749) 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Plans without social 
security offset (N  = 488) 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Plans with social security 
offset (N  = 261) 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Mining (N  = 20) 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Hired at 41 
Hired at 51 
Construction (N  = 7) 
Manufacturing (N  = 346) 
Transportation (N = 86) 
Wholesale trade (N = 25) 
Retail trade (N = 127) 
Finance (N = 100) 
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The aggregate benefits of persons hired at 5 1 are only about 50% of the 
benefits of those hired at 3  1. Persons hired at 41 would accumulate about 
80%  of  the benefits  of  persons  hired  at 31.  There is  little difference 
between plans with and without  a social security offset, based on the 
weighted average of plan ratios. Variation among occupations is not strik- 
ing, but there is substantial variation across industries. Benefits if hired at 
51 range from only 31% of the benefits if hired at 31 in retail trade to 78% 
in manufacturing. The ratio if hired at 41 ranges from 65% in retail trade 
to 95% in transportation. 
Thus job change can impose a very large cost in pension benefits. While 
these calculations do not incorporate vesting on one job before changing 
to another, we believe that such calculations-more  in line with the illus- 
trations in Section 3.1-would  not substantially alter the order of magni- 
tude of the benefit losses. Because we  used accrued benefits at age 65, the 
calculations also incorporate some negative accruals after the age of early 
retirement. It may be more appropriate to use maximum accrued benefits 
for each age of hire. 
3.4  Concluding Comments 
In our view the magnitude, patterns, and variations in pension accrual 
ratios are strikingly at odds with the view of spot clearing in labor mar- 
kets. While market clearing in longer-term contracts seems the only equi- 
librium theory consistent with these findings, it strains our credulity to as- 
cribe optimizing behavior to the choice of  pension accrual profiles. It 
seems much more likely that employees and employers rough tune rather 
than fine tune in their choice of pension plans, if there is any tuning what- 
soever. 
In our future research we intend to examine the ratio of accrued vested 
benefits to straight wages after the age of normal retirement. Preliminary 
evidence suggests very sizable potential work disincentives after the nor- 
mal retirement age because of a sharp decline in pension benefit accrual. 
We will also focus on the particular plan features having the greatest effect 
on accrual profiles. Plans with non-earnings-related benefit formulas as 
well as plans with early and normal retirement supplemental benefits will 
also be studied. Given the appropriate data, we wish to investigate the re- 
lationship  between individual earnings profiles and associated pension 
plans. In particular, we would like to know the extent to which wages ad- 
just in accordance with pension plan provisions. A second important issue 
is the extent to which pension accrual patterns affect retirement decisions 
as well as turnover prior to vesting, early retirement, and normal retire- 
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Notes 
1. This assumes no other explicit or implicit fringe benefits. 
2. We  are hopeful that the Department of Labor’s extremely valuable survey of Private 
Pension Benefit Amounts will be released in the near future. 
3. Bulow (1979) appears to be the first discussion of  these discontinuities. Lazear (1981, 
1983) presents empirical analysis of this issue. 
4. The BLS-LOB survey contains 3248 plans of which the BLS labeled 2492 as “usable.” 
Our master sample consists of 2343 of these 2492 plans, although this study only examines 
1183 plans. 
5. We make no use here of the truncated earnings data contained in the RHS social security 
earnings records. 
6. The 1183 earnings-based plans with cliff vesting account for 51% of plans weighted by 
pension coverage. 
Comment  Zvi Bodie 
Laurence Kotlikoff and David Wise try to accomplish two goals in their 
paper. The first is to describe the age-tenure profiles of pension benefit ac- 
cruals over a worker’s career implied by the provisions of  actual defined 
benefit plans, and the second is to test whether those profiles are consis- 
tent with a “spot market” theory of labor contracting. According to this 
theory the total compensation-wages  plus the present value of pension 
benefits-paid  to a worker in each year of employment must equal the ex- 
pected value of his marginal product in that same year. In the context of 
this theory, the present value of pension benefits earned through contin- 
ued service during any year must be evaluated as if the worker’s employ- 
ment were to be terminated at year’s end. 
If  wages follow a smooth trajectory over a worker’s career, then the 
stipulations of a typical defined benefit plan with “cliff” vesting and early 
retirement benefits that are better than actuarially fair imply that the pro- 
file of earned pension increments will have two spikes in it, one in the year 
vesting occurs and one at the age of  early retirement. Because Kotlikoff 
and Wise assumed that the age-tenure profiles of both wages and the un- 
observable marginal product are smooth, they interpret these spikes as 
strong evidence against the spot market theory. 
I want to begin my critical comments by saying that I think Kotlikoff 
and Wise are to be congratulated for undertaking the enormous task of 
programming the stipulations of these plans and systematically analyzing 
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them. Defined benefit plans are extremely complicated because there are 
so many dimensions along which they can differ, and I think the Kotlikoff- 
Wise paper helps us to understand the quantitative impact of these differ- 
ences. 
At the same time I  have some reservations  and questions about what 
they have done. My first three comments relate to the purely descriptive 
aspects of their work, while my last is directed at their tests of  the spot 
market theory. 
First, they have assumed for all 522 plans in their sample that if a work- 
er terminates employment prior to the age of early retirement he is still en- 
titled to early retirement benefits. I believe that this is not true for many, if 
not most, plans. This feature makes a big difference for the profile of pen- 
sion increments. If a plan provides early retirement benefits only to par- 
ticipants who remain with the firm until early retirement age, then relative 
to the profiles shown by Kotlikoff and Wise in their figure 3.1, for exam- 
ple, (1) the spike at vesting (age 40) is smaller; (2) the spike at early retire- 
ment age (55) is much larger; and (3) the whole profile of pension incre- 
ments up to age 54 is much lower. 
Second,  in generating  their  nominal  wage  trajectories  Kotlikoff  and 
Wise ignore secular growth in real  wages that might  arise from trend 
growth in labor productivity. In effect the pension increment profiles they 
show all implicitly assume that this growth rate is zero. While this may 
have been true for many sectors of the United States economy in the dec- 
ade of  the 1970s, it certainly was not true before then, and even if Kotli- 
koff and Wise think zero the most likely number, I believe it is still worth 
showing the effect of a positive growth rate. 
Third, I  find one aspect of the results reported in table 3.5 absolutely 
mystifying.  The next to the last column in that table presents the mini- 
mum accrual rates among the plans in the sample. How can these be nega- 
tive at all ages? I can understand  their turning negative for some plans 
after the age of early retirement, but not earlier. 
My remaining comments deal with Kotlikoff and Wise’s methodology 
for testing the spot labor market theory.  While I agree that the spikes in 
the profile of pension benefit accruals, particularly the one at early retire- 
ment age, are difficult to explain in the context of a strict spot market the- 
ory, I do not think that they have provided a real test of that theory in its 
less strict and perhaps more credible form. 
Granting their assumption that the age-tenure profile of marginal prod- 
uct of labor is smooth, a real test of the theory would compare the wage 
and total compensation profiles of workers in firms with defined benefit 
pension plans to those of workers without such plans. Lacking appropri- 
ate data to perform such a comparison, Kotlikoff and Wise have simply 
assumed  a smooth wage profile  for workers  with  such plans (they fit a 
quadratic functional form to the wage data, thus guaranteeing smooth- 87  Labor Compensation and the Structure of Private Pension Plans 
ness) and therefore, given the vesting and early retirement provisions, the 
pension accrual and the total compensation profiles must exhibit spikes. 
A proper test of the spot market theory would also require information on 
the age-tenure profile of other forms of labor compensation in addition to 
wages and pension benefits. 
Kotlikoff and Wise are aware of the shortcomings of  their data set for 
testing the spot market theory, and they are attempting to get data on 
wage and benefit profiles for workers controlling for the characteristics of 
the pension plan they participate in. They also plan to explore further the 
disincentives to job change turnover implicit in the stipulations of  the 
plans in their current data set. David Ellwood in his table 2.9 presents 
some illustrative calculations  of  the  present value of  lost benefits if  a 
worker changes jobs, and they appear quite significant under reasonable 
assumptions about the rate of inflation. 
In conclusion I again congratulate David Ellwood and Kotlikoff and 
Wise for a difficult job done well. 
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